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Alvin Roth remarks that, although it often 
gets in the way of market exchanges, “predict-
ing when repugnance will play a decisive role 
is difficult, because apparently similar activities 
and transactions are often judged differently” (Roth 2007, p. 42–43). It certainly took the
staff of Space World by surprise. In November 
of 2016, in the Japanese city of Kitakyushu, the 
management of the Space World theme park was 
looking for a way to boost attendance at their 
ice rink. To this end, they purchased about five 
thousand fish of various kinds from the local 
market—sprats, mackerel, rays, and other spe-
cies—and froze them into the rink in a variety 
of attractive and whimsical patterns. The park’s 
management thought that both the innovative 
display and the prospect of gliding above the 
suspended fish would surprise and delight vis-
itors to the park all through the winter.
People were disgusted. Public reaction was 
swift, unequivocal, and rapidly international 
in scale. The rink was condemned as creepy, 
grotesque, and abusive; an insulting waste of 
food; and an affront to both human and piscine 
dignity. Space World’s spokespeople scram-
bled to react. They apologized profusely. They 
lamented that they had perhaps not done a good 
enough job explaining to the public that the fish 
were already dead when they had been frozen in 
the rink. (Pointing this out did not seem to help
matters.) By the end of the affair, the story was
running around the world, the rink was being 
thawed, and Space World was reportedly con-
sidering holding a memorial service for the fish.
I. Repugnance as a Constraint on Exchange
How should we think about this or similar 
cases? It is tempting to begin, as the park man-
agement initially did, by enumerating the vari-
ous ways that the public’s reaction was irrational 
or inconsistent. An ice rink with thousands of 
artistically arranged dead fish turned out to be 
repugnant. But it is easy to think of very simi-
lar cases that probably would not have provoked 
the same reaction. A local market filled with the 
same dead fish destined for dinner plates is not 
repugnant. Neither would a tank full of thou-
sands of trapped living fish provoke much reac-
tion, most of the time. Moving along a different 
axis, visitors to natural history museums see 
pinned, stuffed, or otherwise preserved animals 
all the time. We could easily multiply examples. 
Once we see that the initial repugnant reaction 
has a weak basis, it should be possible to focus 
on the benefits—like a nice family day out at 
Space World—that would flow from allowing 
those who would like to visit the rink to buy a 
ticket.
From the 1980s into the 2000s, a steady stream 
of articles by economists pursued something 
like this strategy when analyzing the shortage 
of transplantable human organs, and especially 
kidneys (Cohen 1989; Hansmann 1989; Blair
and Kaserman 1991; Kaserman and Barnett 
2002). An exemplary treatment, by Becker and
Elías (2007) estimates the likely price of trans-
plantable kidneys and livers, and the probable 
increase in supply as the result of introducing 
monetary incentives. The authors also consider 
various criticisms and objections. They point out 
that many quite similar transactions do not pro-
voke the reaction that exchange is immoral, or 
a suspect case of “commodification.” They note 
the similarities to surrogacy, for instance, as one 
of several cases of exchange in human goods 
that goes ahead without much controversy. 
They also develop the example of voluntary 
paid military service as a useful point of com-
parison, involving as it does similar questions 
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of bodily risk, quality control, the independent 
moral value of the activity, and the possibility 
of crowding out of other motives. And like most 
of the previous literature in this vein, they end 
by quite reasonably arguing that reliance on a 
purely altruistic system “imposes an intolerable 
burden on thousands of very ill individuals who 
suffer and sometimes die” as they await a trans-
plant (Becker and Elías 2007, p. 22).
This way of framing the discussion within 
economics descends from a debate between 
Arrow (1972) and Singer (1973) in the wake of 
Titmuss’s (1971) indictment of the market for 
blood in his book The Gift Relationship. Later 
interventions by Walzer (1983) and Anderson (1993) kept the engagement on mostly phil-
osophical terrain, focused on the idea of com-
modification. Economists were generally 
unpersuaded by the idea, and instead empha-
sized the welfare benefits flowing from mutu-
ally beneficial exchanges, even when those 
exchanges might seem distasteful to some 
observers. Debate tended to stall out in dis-
agreements about how to weigh gains from trade 
against moral goods.
Roth (2007) took a slightly different approach. 
His discussion of repugnance acknowledged 
both its often arbitrary quality and its stubborn 
persistence in the case of many (but not all) 
exchanges in bodily goods. The focus on repug-
nance as an empirical phenomenon, in contrast 
to commodification as a moral problem, opened 
a connection to research on the psychology and 
sociology of exchange. It also shifted attention 
to the role of repugnance in constraining trade, 
and the challenge it posed when considered as a 
problem of market design. The goal then became 
one of constructing systems—such as an in-kind 
kidney exchange scheme—that succeed in real-
izing gains without triggering a repugnance 
reaction among participants or among observers 
in the wider world.
II. Repugnance as a Management Problem
In the easiest transactions, prices specify 
the costs and gains for all those involved and 
there is no controversy about the goods or the 
exchange partners. While it is tempting to think 
of these as the simplest cases, often it is the 
quickest and most straightforward transactions 
that require the most institutional infrastructure. 
Stock exchange trades, to take just one example, 
 happen easily thanks to a vast institutional and 
regulatory structure that underpins and guides 
them.
Other transactions are not so clear-cut. In 
such cases, both participants and observers want 
to establish what sort of exchange is happen-
ing, in order to ensure not just that it is mutu-
ally beneficial but also that it is in some sense 
legitimate, respectable, or appropriate to the 
statuses or roles of those involved. It is in these 
circumstances that repugnance can appear, and 
also when various strategies to ameliorate it may 
be deployed.
Social scientists have documented the strat-
egies that people employ to manage these 
awkward exchanges. They are generally inter-
preted as cases where something in a socially 
sacred category threatens to come into contact 
with the generally profane world of money and 
prices (Bohannan 1955). The exchange may be 
shut down, actively reclassified, or reframed (Fiske and Tetlock 1997). It may take place 
after substantial “relational work” is done by 
participants to manage its potentially negative 
effects (Zelizer 2005). Or it may be structur-
ally recast and obfuscated, so participants can 
plausibly claim it is not an exchange at all (Rossman 2014). The strategies are more sta-
ble than the particular sacred things, which—
as Durkheim (1997) long ago argued—can be 
quite arbitrary.
The most widespread methods for ameliorat-
ing repugnance have deep roots. They often rely 
on some form of gift exchange, on a mutually 
understood local rule governing ongoing reci-
procity between kinds of actors, or on contin-
gent agreements concerning the acceptability 
of a transaction. Understanding basic strategies 
of reframing and obfuscation helps us see how 
exchanges are accomplished locally, and helps 
us understand how individuals reframe transac-
tions to make them palatable.
However, the growth of potentially repugnant 
exchanges creates new problems. The scale and 
scope of trade in bodily goods, for example, 
means that individuals neither broker transac-
tions on their own, nor individually agree on 
the character of individual exchanges. Instead, 
the management of repugnance happens orga-
nizationally and institutionally (Healy 2006). 
Organizational staff, e.g., in hospitals or pro-
curement organizations, frame and manage the 
exchange for donors and recipients who are 
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usually one-shot participants in a transplant 
process. This also means that organizations are 
embedded in ongoing relationships of their own, 
not with individual patients but with peer orga-
nizations and agencies involved in the process 
of supply and demand. Their staff will be con-
cerned to establish the legitimacy of the organi-
zation as well as to defend its perceived interests (Healy and Krawiec 2012).
III. Repugnance Management as a Legal
Problem
These strategies may give rise to legal prob-
lems that subsequently constrain the ability 
of market participants to engage in particular 
forms of repugnance management. In particu-
lar, the persistence of gift-like solutions to taboo 
trades may be at odds with a transaction’s legal 
categorization as market-based, creating tension 
between an accepted, and useful, cultural narra-
tive, on the one hand, and legal definitions and 
requirements, on the other.
Sometimes, the result of these tensions may 
be merely inconvenient, as when, for example, 
egg donors, having been told that the money 
received from egg donation is a thank-you gift, 
resist taxation of that same money as ordinary 
income, to the consternation of the IRS and tax 
courts. At other times, the result could be much 
more severe, as would be the case if innovations 
in kidney exchange were, ex post, ruled to vio-
late the National Organ Transplantation Act’s 
ban against valuable consideration, even though 
no money has changed hands. The egg donor 
example involves unpleasant tax consequences 
for individual donors and may—at least in the 
long term—undermine the gift narrative that 
market participants work so hard to foster. But 
the organ donation case could result in the termi-
nation of life-saving procedures and, in theory at 
least, the criminal prosecution of exchange par-
ticipants and organizers.
At any particular layer, exchange partners or 
brokering organizations must manage the reac-
tions of their peers. Coordinating organizations 
like hospitals, transplant centers, and fertility 
centers must work with both donors and recip-
ients to find a format for the exchange that is 
both medically safe, acceptable in terms of costs 
and benefits, and not repugnant. Otherwise, par-
ticipants will back out and the transaction will 
fail. But repugnance also arises vertically. State 
actors, like the IRS, the Department of Health 
and Human Services, and courts, are concerned 
about avoiding repugnant or corrupt transac-
tions, too. As will be shown, decisions made 
at this level may rely on a quite different set of 
relevant facts or rules when it comes to deter-
mining whether an exchange violates a legal or 
ethical standard.
Egg donation—where the obfuscating role 
of gift exchange is particularly evident—pro-
vides a useful illustration of repugnance man-
agement’s horizontal and vertical elements. 
Exchange in human eggs has long successfully 
incorporated substantial payments to donors. 
Although donors are well-compensated, fertil-
ity organizations, egg donors, and egg recipi-
ents all characterize egg donation as a precious 
gift. Payments to donors are often packaged as a 
“thank-you” gesture by recipients or as a form of 
cash compensation for discomfort experienced 
in the donation process that could never (and is
not intended to) fully compensate a donor giv-
ing the miraculous “gift of parenthood.” This 
framing is strongly encouraged by fertility orga-
nizations, who often remind donors not to think 
in self-interested terms about the money they 
will receive, and who distrust donors who seem 
overly motivated by the prospect of payment (Almeling 2011).
Although market participants may share a 
vision of egg donation as a gift-like exchange 
in which some money changes hands, this is 
not a categorization recognized by the law, 
which often requires firm definitions where 
participants would prefer none. In the case of 
egg donation, for example, some questions that 
arise are: Is the money received by donors tax-
able income? If not, then what do the payments 
represent? If donors are to be taxed, then what 
type of income is it: income from the sale of 
assets (the eggs) or income from the provision
of a service?
Perhaps it is a testament to the power of gift 
framing that, until recently, there was no defin-
itive statement on the proper tax treatment of 
proceeds earned from egg donation, despite the 
thousands of babies born each year in the United 
States from donated eggs. Instead, at least some 
egg donors simply contested the inclusion of 
their compensation in taxable income, with IRS 
acquiescence. The tax court intervened in 2015, 
however. Although egg donation may be a lov-
ing and priceless gift in the eyes of exchange 
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participants, from a tax perspective it is simply a 
risky job, like boxing, football, or fishing.1
The fact that egg donor compensation occurs 
within a gift-based cultural account poses other 
problems as well. Payments of up to $10,000 are 
hard enough to square with a gift narrative, but 
participants managed it. Egg donation is phys-
ically risky, after all, and there was a general 
consensus that egg donors deserved something 
for their efforts. Besides, all market participants 
recognized that without some compensation 
there would be very few egg donors. But once 
incentives enter the picture they threaten to 
undermine gift framing entirely. Would fertility 
centers and patients compete for the most desir-
able egg donors? How do you square extremely 
large payments that vary with the donor’s 
beauty, intelligence, or race with the notion that 
payments to egg donors are mere thank-you 
gestures or a token in recognition of physical 
discomfort?
To address these concerns, the fertility indus-
try eventually settled on “ethical pricing guide-
lines” that limited egg donor compensation to a 
maximum of $10,000 per donation cycle (Ethics 
Committee of the ASRM 2004). Such an agree-
ment, they argued, would not only reinforce that 
egg donors were motivated, at least in part, by 
altruism, but would also protect against coer-
cion and commodification, and ensure the safety 
of egg donation for both donors and recipients. 
Once again, however, the state (and the plain-
tiffs’ bar) saw things differently. Specifically, 
they saw an illegal agreement among compet-
itors not to compete on price, in violation of 
US antitrust law (Krawiec 2015). The result-
ing nationwide class action lawsuit eventually 
settled, with the fertility industry agreeing to 
remove the pricing guidelines and to implement 
no others in their place (Krawiec 2015).
IV. Conclusion
Researchers have come a long way toward 
understanding the role of repugnance when con-
sidering transactions in the human body. Yet, 
often, the focus remains on exchange between 
individuals and how they mentally cope (or not) 
with repugnance. But these exchanges entail an 
1 Perez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 144 T.C. 
4 (2015). 
additional “vertical” dimension. Organizational 
and state actors play a role both in directly man-
aging repugnance in exchange and in placing 
limits on the specific repugnance management 
tools that market organizers may employ.
By treating repugnance as a problem that 
arises not only between individuals, but also at 
organizational and regulatory levels, we can bet-
ter see why it is unlikely that a single, harmo-
nized system of exchange in bodily goods will 
emerge with the passage of time. The consolida-
tion and success of particular exchanges (such 
as with organs, eggs, or bone marrow) tends to 
create new problems in different parts of the 
system. The result is that the management of 
exchange in particular goods tends to fluctuate 
between different forms, depending on the kind 
of moral, ethical, or legal problem that people 
want to avoid.
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